Protection Desk
On January 24, 2026, the Additional Session Judge, Islamabad, convicted Imaan Mazari under Sections 9, 10, and 26-A of the PECA, 2016. She has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment (RI) for five years with a fine of Rs 5 million under Section 9, RI for 10 years with a fine of Rs30 million under Section 10, and RI for two years with a fine of Rs1 million under Section 26-A.
The petitioner instituted a criminal appeal before the Islamabad High Court, requesting to suspend the impugned judgment of the trial court, as it was completely illegal and clearly mala fide, as it violated due process requirements under Articles 10 and 10A of the Constitution. On February 19, 2026, the IHC issued a notice on the application instead of suspending the sentence.
She submitted that on February 27, 2026, an urgent application for early hearing was filed before the IHC, which was neither granted nor fixed, and instead the early application was referred to the IHC Chief Justice. On March 5, 2026, the petitioner was informed that the IHC, through an administrative order, had returned the early hearing application because the previous early hearing application was still pending.
The petitioner submitted that she has not only been denied suspension of sentence in the impugned order dated February 19, 2026, but is in effect made a remedy less, as even the early hearing application of the petitioner has not been fixed, therefore she approached the Supreme Court.
She submitted that the invocation of offences under Sections 9, 10, and 26-A of PECA, in the absence of any credible evidence, reflects a clear attempt to criminalise the petitioner’s voice under the guise of lawful prosecution. The impugned judgment, rendered without any evidentiary basis or legal justification, exemplifies how PECA has been used to penalize criticism of state policies. This case serves as a chilling precedent, signalling that any challenge to state excesses may invite criminal sanction.
Imaan Mazari contended that the IHC has erred in the impugned order by merely issuing notice on the suspension application of the petitioner, but not suspending the sentence of the petitioner.